Published Papers

This paper examines how cultural differences influence the returns of momentum strategies. Cross‐country cultural differences are measured with an individualism index developed by Hofstede (2001), which is related to overconfidence and self‐attribution bias. We find that individualism is positively associated with trading volume and volatility, as well as to the magnitude of momentum profits. Momentum profits are also positively related to analyst forecast dispersion, transaction costs, and the familiarity of the market to foreigners, and negatively related to firm size and volatility. However, the addition of these and other variables does not dampen the relation between individualism and momentum profits.

This article provides field-experimental evidence on status goods. We work with an Indonesian bank that markets platinum credit cards to high-income customers. In a first experiment, we show that demand for the platinum card exceeds demand for a nondescript control product with identical benefits, suggesting demand for the pure status aspect of the card. Transaction data reveal that platinum cards are more likely to be used in social contexts, implying social image motivations. In a second experiment, we provide evidence of positional externalities from the consumption of these status goods. A final experiment provides suggestive evidence that increasing self-esteem causally reduces demand for status goods,indicating that social image might be a substitute for self-image.

I show that moral concerns can reverse the effect of financial incentives. I analyze a morally ambiguous behavior: reporting peers' wrongdoing. Agents' peers often know more about their behavior than principals do. However, denouncing a peer to an authority is morally controversial, as it might prevent future misconduct but also harm the peer. Authorities often encourage denunciations through financial rewards; yet these incentives can backfire if peers perceive being paid for harming others as morally unacceptable. I run a field experiment with 2,040 employees of the Afghan Ministry of Education, who are asked to confidentially report on their colleagues' attendance. I use a two-by-two design, randomizing whether or not reporting absence carries a monetary incentive as well as the perceived consequentiality of the reports. In the consequential treatment arm, where employees are given examples of the penalties that might be imposed on absentees, 15% of participants choose to denounce their peers when reports are not incentivized. Remarkably, in this consequential group, rewards backfire: Only 10% of employees report when denunciations are incentivized. In the non-consequential group, where participants are guaranteed that their reports will not be forwarded to the government, only 6% of employees denounce absence without rewards. However, when moral concerns of harming others are limited through the guarantee of non-consequentiality, rewards do not backfire: The incentivized reporting rate is 12%. My results suggest that employees report because they share the government's goal of reducing absence but are morally averse to being paid for harming their peers.

We show that institutional investors are more likely to invest in firms from regions to which they have stronger social ties but find no evidence that these investments earn a differential return. Firms in regions with stronger social ties to locations with many institutional investors have higher valuations and liquidity. These effects are largest for small firms with little analyst coverage, suggesting that the investors' behavior is explained by their increased awareness of firms in socially proximate locations. Our results highlight that the social structure of regions affects firms' access to capital and contributes to geographic differences in economic outcomes.

Financial misconduct (FM) rates differ widely between major U.S. cities, up to a factor of 3. Although spatial differences in enforcement and firm characteristics do not account for these patterns, city-level norms appear to be very important. For example, FM rates are strongly related to other unethical behavior, involving politicians, doctors, and (potentially unfaithful) spouses, in the city.

We study whether, how, and why the investment of a firm depends on the investment of other firms in the same product market. Using an instrumental variable based on the presence of local knowledge externalities, we find a sizeable complementarity of investment among product market peers, holding across a large majority of sectors. Peer effects are stronger in concentrated markets, featuring more heterogeneous firms, and for smaller firms with less precise information. Our findings are consistent with a model in which managers are imperfectly informed about fundamentals and use peers' investments as a source of information. Product market peer effects in investment could amplify shocks in production networks.

We examine how adverse local experiences that are uninformative of future returns affect households' investment behavior in the short term. Using data from a German online brokerage and a survey we show that retail investors sharply reduce risk taking in response to nearby firm bankruptcies. Adjustments in risk taking occur through immediate and transitory increases in trading, and seem to work through more pessimistic expectations about aggregate stock returns and increased risk aversion. Changes in background risks or wealth effects cannot explain our findings. Extrapolation from local experiences to aggregate expectations is inconsistent with optimal use of full or limited information.

This study examines whether sell-side equity analysts engage in "social learning" in which their earnings forecasts for certain firms are influenced by the forecasts and outcomes of "peer" analysts associated with other firms in their respective portfolios. We find that analyst optimism is negatively correlated with recent forecast errors, by peers, on other firms in the analyst's portfolio. An analyst is also more likely to issue "bold" forecasts when peers recently issued similar forecasts for other portfolio firms. Analysts learn more from peers with similar personal characteristics. Overall, social learning benefits analysts and improves their forecast accuracy.

Foreign migration flows have important stock market consequences. Foreign-born resident networks within U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) are associated with excess return comovement between locally headquartered stocks and American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) from countries with ties to the MSA through the network of foreign-born residents. This comovement is hardly due to correlated fundamentals and at least partially driven by correlated trading within members of a common investor base consisting of foreign-born residents. Our evidence has implications for both investors and foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) seeking to reap benefits from cross-listings and is consistent with the notion that foreign-born residents exhibit both local bias and home (country) bias.

We hypothesize that social trust, in mitigating contracting incompleteness, may have an important effect on the activeness and effectiveness of delegated portfolio management. Using a complete sample of worldwide open-end mutual funds, we find that trust is positively associated with the activeness of funds and that trust-related active share delivers superior performance (e.g., approximately 2% per year for cross-border investments). Moreover, "trust in the market" and "trust in managers" play important yet different roles for different types of cross-border delegated portfolio management. Our results suggest that trust acts as a fundamental building block for delegated portfolio management.

We survey 462 financial journalists and conduct 18 interviews to obtain insights on the inputs to their reporting, the incentives they face, and the factors that influence their coverage decisions. We report many findings relevant to the accounting literature and identify multiple avenues for future research. For example, financial journalists say the likelihood they write about a specific company or CEO increases when the company is controversial or the CEO has a colorful personality, suggesting journalists gravitate toward provocative topics. We also find that financial journalists routinely use company-issued disclosures and private phone calls with company management when developing articles, and that they believe they are evaluated primarily on the accuracy, timeliness, and depth of their articles. Journalists also believe monitoring companies to hold them accountable is one of financial journalism's most important objectives, but they often face negative consequences for writing articles that portray companies in an unfavorable light.

This paper shows that the network of relationships between brokers and institutional investors shapes information diffusion in the stock market. Central brokers gather information by executing informed trades, which is then leaked to their best clients. After large informed trades, other institutional investors are significantly more likely to execute similar trades through the same broker, allowing them to capture returns that are twice as large as their normal trading performance. Also indicative of information leakage, the clients of the broker employed by activist investors to execute their trades buy the same stocks just before the filing of the 13D.