Published Papers

Although gender differences are fairly consistent when people report their general confidence, much less is known about such differences when individuals assess the degree of confidence they have in their ability to answer any particular test question. The objective of this research was to investigate gender differences in item-specific confidence judgments. Data were collected from 3 psychology courses containing 70 men and 181 women. After answering each item on course exams, students indicated their confidence that their answer to that item was correct. Results showed that gender differences in confidence are dependent on the context (whether items were correct or wrong) and on the domain being tested. Moreover, although both men and women were overconfident, undergraduate men were especially overconfident when incorrect.

This paper studies the role of workplace peers in the transmission of information pertinent to an important household financial decision: the mortgage refinancing choice. Exploiting commonalities in teaching schedules of school teachers in Texas to identify peer groups, we find that refinancing activity among teachers' peers increases their likelihood of refinancing by 20.7%. The effect of peers increases with the potential savings realized upon refinancing and is stronger among younger teachers. Peers also affect teachers' choice of lender. Overall, our findings suggest that peer interactions greatly reduce a household's cost of acquiring and processing financial information.

This study examines for evidence of peer effects in the trading decisions of individual investors from Mainland China, a country whose cultural and social structures are vastly different from those of Western countries. Cultural differences, as widely documented, play a significant role in social interactions and word-of-mouth behavior. In contrast to US studies, we find robust evidence that the trading decisions of Chinese investors are influenced, via word of mouth, by those of their peers who maintain brokerage accounts at the same branch, but not by those whose accounts are maintained at another branch located in the same city.

No agent has the resources to monitor all events that are potentially relevant for his decisions. Therefore, many delegate their information choice to specialized news providers that monitor the world on their behalf and report only a curated selection of events. We document empirically that, while different outlets typically emphasize different topics, major events shift the general news focus and make coverage more homogeneous. We propose a theoretical framework that formalizes this type of state-dependent editorial behavior by introducing news selection functions. We prove that (i) agents can always reduce the entropy of their posterior beliefs by delegating their information choice, (ii) state-dependent reporting conveys information not only via the contents of a story, but also via the decision of what to report, and (iii) an event that is reported by all news providers is common knowledge among agents only if it is also considered maximally newsworthy by all providers. As an application, we embed delegated news selection into a simple beauty-contest model to demonstrate how it affects actions in a setting with strategic interactions.

We find that socially connected fund managers have more similar holdings and trades. The overlap of funds whose managers reside in the same neighborhood is considerably higher than that of funds whose managers live in the same city but in different neighborhoods. These effects are larger when managers share a similar ethnic background, and are not explained by preferences. Valuable information is transmitted through these peer networks: a long-short strategy composed of stocks purchased minus sold by neighboring managers delivers positive risk-adjusted returns. Unlike prior empirical work, our tests disentangle the effects of social interactions from community effects.

A unique data set from a large Ponzi scheme allows me to study word-of-mouth diffusion of investment information. Investors could join the scheme only by invitation from an existing member, which allows me to observe how the idea spreads from one person to the next based on inviter-invitee relationships. I find that the observed social network has a scale-free connectivity structure, which significantly facilitates the diffusion of the investment idea and contributes to the growth and survival of the socially spreading Ponzi scheme. I further find that investors invest more if their inviter has comparatively higher age, education, and income.

Power transforms consumer behavior. This research introduces a critical theoretical moderator of power's effects by promoting the idea that power is accompanied by both an experience (how it feels to have or lack power) and expectations (schemas and scripts as to how those with or without power behave). In some cases, the psychological experience of power predisposes people to behave one way, whereas attention to the expectations of power suggests behaving in another way. As a consequence, power's effects for consumer behavior can hinge on consumers' focus. Specifically, a focus on the experience or expectations of power critically moderates how power affects both information processing and status seeking. However, as the experience of power incites a desire to act, and the powerful are expected to act, power produces more action regardless of focus. These findings provide a new lens on power and have important implications for consumer behavior.

Facebook is a ubiquitous platform for self-disclosure; however, norms associated with online and offline disclosure appear to differ. The present study investigated whether people's disposition to disclose and comfort with others' disclosures of negatively-valenced content differs online and offline. Additionally, psychological predictors of offline and online disclosure were explored. Results revealed that offline disclosure of negatively-valenced personal information is preferred to online disclosure and that comfort with others' disclosure of such information is greater offline than online. As information becomes more sensitive, the likelihood of sharing this information online decreases; similarly, the degree of comfort with others' online disclosure of such information decreases. Agreeableness was positively correlated with reactions to others' online posts. Agreeableness, openness, self-esteem and emotional stability were positively correlated with comfort with others' offline disclosures. Tendency to disclose online was higher for those with low emotional stability and low openness (but only for some scenarios). Age effects were most prominent with respect to the information shared and comfort with others' disclosures, but across age groups there was a preference for offline, rather than online, sharing. Collectively, the results reveal that individual differences are weaker predictors of online disclosure than the nature of information disclosed.

Self-presentation is a fundamental aspect of social life, with myriad critical outcomes dependent on others' impressions. We identify and offer the first empirical investigation of a prevalent, yet understudied, self-presentation strategy: humblebragging. Across 9 studies, including a week-long diary study and a field experiment, we identify humblebragging-bragging masked by a complaint or humility-as a common, conceptually distinct, and ineffective form of self-presentation. We first document the ubiquity of humblebragging across several domains, from everyday life to social media. We then show that both forms of humblebragging-complaint-based or humility-based--are less effective than straightforward bragging, as they reduce liking, perceived competence, compliance with requests, and financial generosity. Despite being more common, complaint-based humblebrags are less effective than humility-based humblebrags, and are even less effective than simply complaining. We show that people choose to deploy humblebrags particularly when motivated to both elicit sympathy and impress others. Despite the belief that combining bragging with complaining or humility confers the benefits of each strategy, we find that humblebragging confers the benefits of neither, instead backfiring because it is seen as insincere.

Questionnaire surveys of institutional and individual investors were undertaken to learn about patterns of communications. It was found that direct interpersonal communications are very important in investor decisions. Questions elicited what fraction of investors were unsystematic and allowed themselves to be influenced by word-of-mouth communications or other salient stimuli. Randomly sampled investors were studied as well as investors in stocks whose price had recently increased dramatically. Contagion or epidemic models of financial markets are proposed in which interest in individual stocks is spread by word of mouth. The survey evidence is interpreted as supporting such models.

I test whether social influence affects individual investors' trading and stock returns. In each of the 20 most active stocks in Finland over 9 years, the number of owners in a municipality multiplied by the number of investors who do not own a stock, a measure of the rate of transmission of diseases and rumors through social contact, predicts individual investor trading. I control for known determinants of trade, including daily news, and show that competing explanations for the relation are unlikely. Socially motivated trades predict stock returns, and the effects are not reversed, suggesting that individuals share useful information. Individuals' susceptibility to social influence has declined during the period, but the opportunities for social influence have increased.

Using the historical random assignment of MBA students to sections at Harvard Business School (HBS), I explore how executive peer networks can affect managerial decision making. Within an HBS class, firm outcomes are significantly more similar among graduates from the same section than among graduates from different sections, with the strongest effects in executive compensation and acquisitions strategy. I demonstrate the role of ongoing social interactions by showing that peer effects are more than twice as strong in the year following staggered alumni reunions. Supplementary tests suggest that peer influence can operate in ways that do not contribute to firm productivity.