Working Papers

Social norms are typically thought to be persistent and long-lasting, sometimes surviving through growth, recessions, and regime changes. In some cases, however, they can quickly change. This paper examines the unraveling of social norms in communication when new information becomes available, e.g., aggregated through elections. We build a model of strategic communication between citizens who can hold one of two mutually exclusive opinions. In our model, agents communicate their opinions to each other, and senders care about receivers' approval. As a result, senders are more likely to express the more popular opinion, while receivers make less inference about senders who stated the popular view. We test these predictions using two experiments. In the main experiment, we identify the causal effect of Donald Trump's rise in political popularity on individuals' willingness to publicly express xenophobic views. Participants in the experiment are offered a bonus reward if they authorize researchers to make a donation to an anti-immigration organization on their behalf. Participants who expect their decision to be observed by the surveyor are significantly less likely to accept the offer than those expecting an anonymous choice. Increases in participants' perceptions of Trump's popularity (either through experimental variation or through the "natural experiment" of his victory) eliminate the wedge between private and public behavior. A second experiment uses dictator games to show that participants judge a person less negatively for publicly expressing (but not for privately holding) a political view they disagree with if that person's social environment is one where the majority of people holds that view.

Financial history studies facts and institutions of the past. Such facts and institutions are interesting subjects in themselves, or they can help us interpret the present through analogy. History & Finance reverses the role of history in finance research: it exploits natural experiments of the past as a means to directly explaining current financial outcomes through the long-run persistence of economic and social phenomena. I first define the History & Finance approach and its relationship to Economic and Financial history. Then, I survey the work based on History & Finance across the subfields of finance. I discuss the challenges raised by History & Finance, and how researchers have thus far tackled them. Finally, I comment on the avenues for future research that History & Finance opens to finance scholars and economic historians alike.

Despite the focus of entrepreneurial finance research on high-tech innovation, more than 75% of innovations are new processes and products in traditional manufacturing. I show that basic education is a key determinant of innovation in traditional industries. I document that manufacturers in European regions with 10% more high school graduates file 15% more patents, and invest 4% more in capital expenditures. To absorb spatially correlated unobservables, I construct Virtual Regions that only exploit the variation in basic education across nearby locations. To address the possibility of reverse causality, I establish that regional basic education persists for decades, and I use the quasi-exogenous diffusion of the printing press after 1450 to instrument for historical basic education. The results offer a human capital channel for innovation that feeds into the innovation-to-investment literature in finance.

I test a set of predictions that constitute an identity theory of choice under risk using large-scale artefactual field experiments. Men whose identity is primed or threatened invest more in risky opportunities than other men and women. They become overconfident even in pure games of chance with no scope for skill, which is consistent with the motivated-beliefs channel identity theory postulates. The effects are stronger for men who are more likely to commit to male identity - older men and men in the Southern US. I show identity theory can contribute to explain negative-expected-value investment by risk-averse agents (e.g., trading individual stocks) and overinvestment in delegated choice under risk (e.g., managerial overinvestment) using simple financial opportunities. Because behaving in line with their identity increases men's utility, departures from expected utility theory are not necessarily suboptimal in this identity theory of choice under risk.

Anti-market ideology pre-exists modern capitalism, is diffused in capitalistic economies, and peaks during economic crises. Is anti-market ideology an inert cultural by-product of crises, or does it affect economic decision making? If it does, through which channels? I manipulate exposure to anti-market ideology in an artefactual field experiment. Subjects exposed to anti-market ideology invest less often and less money in risky financial opportunities than controls. The effect is stronger for women, older, and college-educated subjects. Risk aversion does not change with exposure. Instead, treated subjects have a more negative view of the financial sector, even if they do not realize they are exposed to anti-market ideology. They react to positive news but not to negative news regarding investment payoffs in subsequent investment choices. These results are consistent with context-dependent beliefs. Contrary to behavioral biases, anti-market ideology makes more sophisticated agents deviate from neoclassical decision-making.

We document five effects of providing individuals with crowdsourced spending information about their peers (individuals with similar characteristics) through a FinTech app. First, users who spend more than their peers reduce their spending significantly, whereas users who spend less keep constant or increase their spending. Second, users' distance from their peers' spending affects the reaction monotonically in both directions. Third, users' reaction is asymmetric - spending cuts are three times as large as increases. Fourth, lower-income users react more than others. Fifth, discretionary spending drives the reaction in both directions and especially cash withdrawals, which are commonly used for incidental expenses and anonymous transactions. We argue Bayesian updating, peer pressure, or the fact that bad news looms more than (equally-sized) good news cannot alone explain all these facts.

Despite the importance of trust in determining economic outcomes, little is known about what facilitates or hinders interpersonal trust. Using a randomized field experiment of a fundraising campaign, we examine the role of trust and the determinants of perceived trustworthiness in the context of crowdfunding. The key feature of the experiment involves randomized rotations of the campaign design, which differ in the profile photo, details of campaign description, and the update status. The perceived trustworthiness of these rotations is then independently judged by survey participants. We find that while posting updates significantly increases perceived trustworthiness of the campaign and the funds raised, having a more detailed description has little effect. Our follow-up survey reveals that the differential effects are mostly driven by information salience. Interestingly, displaying a white or male profile photo improves the trustworthiness score and generates a higher contribution level, which can be explained by white participants(and donors) and male participants (and donors) preferences. Finally, we find that effects of campaign updates and the profile photo disappear when donors are directly connected to the fundraising team, highlighting the authentication and trust-transmission role of social networks.

Whether teams attenuate or exacerbate the behavioral biases which are pervasive at the individual level is an open question. To address this question, we use the mutual fund industry as a laboratory. Our focus is on how return extrapolation is transmitted from individual fund managers to the team-managed funds they join. We show that teams heavily attenuate the influence of extrapolation bias on funds' trading behavior. Additional analysis reveals that this attenuation is not due to differences in investment experience, compensation contracts, workload, and investment styles between solo-managed and team-managed funds. Rather, our evidence suggests that the elicitation of team members' inner cognitive reflection can be responsible for teams' reduction in behavioral biases. Our results highlight the attenuation of the extrapolation bias as a potential benefit of team-based asset management.

Are we in a new "Polanyian moment"? If we are, it is essential to examine how "spontaneous" and punctual expressions of discontent at the individual level may give rise to collective discourses driving social and political change. It is also important to examine whether and how the framing of these discourses may vary across political economies. This paper contributes to this endeavor with the analysis of anti-finance discourses on Twitter in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK between 2019 and 2020. This paper presents three main findings. First, the analysis shows that, more than ten years after the financial crisis, finance is still a strong catalyzer of political discontent. Second, it shows that there are important variations in the dominant framing of public anti-finance discourses on social media across European political economies. If the antagonistic "us versus them" is prominent in all the cases, the identification of who "us" and "them" are, vary significantly. Third, it shows that the presence of far-right tropes in the critique of finance varies greatly from virtually inexistent to a solid minority of statements.

We find evidence suggesting that similarity of political views between the CEO and independent directors ("political homophily") encourages the CEO to share adverse information with the board. Firms with higher political homophily have lower stock price crash risk, are more likely to divest previously acquired assets with poor announcement returns, and are more likely to recognize losses in asset value. Furthermore, the effect of political homophily is complemented by strong shareholder governance which prevents friendly board from insulating the CEO in the case of ex post negative outcomes. Our identification utilizes the exogenous variation in political beliefs associated with the entry of a conservative television network in local markets. Our findings show that a friendly board facilitates CEO-board communication which is crucial for the board to function effectively in its advisory role.

We analyze the long-term effects of living under communism and its anticapitalist doctrine on households' financial investment decisions and attitudes towards financial markets. Utilizing comprehensive German brokerage data and bank data, we show that, decades after Reunification, East Germans still invest significantly less in the stock market than West Germans. Consistent with communist friends-and-foes propaganda, East Germans are more likely to hold stocks of companies from communist countries (China, Russia, Vietnam) and of state-owned companies, and are unlikely to invest in American companies and the financial industry. Effects are stronger for individuals exposed to "positive emotional tagging", e. g., those living in celebrated showcase cities. Effects reverse for individuals with negative experiences, e.g., environmental pollution, religious oppression, or lack of (Western) TV entertainment. Election years trigger further divergence of East and West Germans. We provide evidence of negative welfare consequences due to less diversified portfolios, higher-fee products, and lower risk-adjusted returns.

We study how wholesalers assess credit risk and extend trade credit to retailers in informal economies where market institutions, such as financial reporting systems, auditing, and courts, are nonexistent or function poorly. Using the setting of a large market in India, we find that community membership plays a strong role in the access to credit. Wholesalers are more likely to provide trade credit and to offer less restrictive credit terms to within-community retailers, and are more lenient when these retailers default. Our findings suggest that an indirect reciprocity mechanism explains within-community credit flows, as evidenced by wholesalers with low endowments, those with greater within-community information flows about them, and those facing income shocks being more likely to provide preferential lending to their community retailers. The importance of the indirect reciprocity mechanism is further supported by evidence on the help traders receive from their community members following the COVID-19-related income shock.